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Abstract:  
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1. Introduction  
The question how much people are voluntarily willing to pay in order to mitigate climate 
change is a rather new topic on the agenda of empirical economists. Recent studies on this 
issue deliver a quite heterogeneous picture. There are several stated preferences studies (e.g. 
MacKerron et al. 2009, Achtnicht 2012) that find a relatively high value of Willingness-To-
Pay (WTP) for voluntary climate change mitigation. Other studies have utilised a revealed 
preference framework (e.g. Löschel et al. 2013, Diederich and Goeschel 2014a) and in general 
report much lower WTP values.  
One might argue that the stated preferences approach suffers from what has been called the 
hypothetical bias in the literature (e.g., Murphy et al. 2005) and, hence, leads to rather 
optimistic WTP estimates. However, due to differences in study design such as question 
format, subjects’ information about the good, framing, subject pool etc., a simple comparison 
between real and hypothetical WTP for climate change mitigation is difficult. In order to 
make hypothetical bias responsible for the observed “gap” in WTP, a controlled experimental 
study is necessary. Another issue lies in the character of the good at stake. Climate change 
mitigation is a global public good and the values reported in revealed preference WTP studies 
are usually obtained from a decision framework where individuals face the opportunity to free 
ride on emissions reductions by others. While the WTP obtained in such a framework is 
certainly of interest, it is conceivable that the corresponding WTP is higher in a decision 
framework which, at least partly, excludes the free riding opportunity by introducing some 
form of collective decision making. For example, the median voting rule has been shown to 
be a powerful device in order to increase cooperation in social dilemma situations (e.g. 
Walker et al. 2000, Bernard et al. 2013, Hauser et al. 2014).  
The objective of this paper is to investigate the magnitude of hypothetical bias in the 
voluntary demand for the global public good climate change mitigation and whether a 
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collective action within a small group of subjects can increase this demand. For this purpose 
we run a web-based experiment. Participants chose between a cash price in Euro and a 
European Union Allowance (EUA) which would be deleted after the experiment. From the 
observed demand the WTP is derived. This basic design was first used by Diederich and 
Goeschl (2014a) and here it is implemented both with real monetary incentives and as a 
purely hypothetical decision situation. Furthermore, we introduced a collective action in 
which the group (n = 100) voted whether all members purchased the offered EUAs or 
received the cash price.  
We find a rather small but statistically significant hypothetical bias in the demand for 
voluntary climate change mitigation. Hypothetical bias defined as the ratio of hypothetical to 
real WTP amounts to 1.15 for the individual decision situation and 1.20 in case of collective 
action. The observed real WTP for voluntary climate change mitigation is about 17€ per tCO2. 
Collective action increases voluntary demand for climate change mitigation in a hypothetical 
decision situation, but does not affect choice if subjects face real monetary incentives.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
related literature. Section 3 describes the sample and the experimental design and Section 4 
derives our theoretical predictions. We present the experimental results in Section 5 and 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related literature 
There are at least three branches of literature directly related to our study – both from the 
perspective of voluntary demand for climate change mitigation as well as from a 
methodological point of view. At first are the several stated preferences studies which have 
recently explored the question of demand for voluntary climate change mitigation and derived 
WTP for climate change mitigation in monetary units per tCO2.1 Brouwer et al. (2008) asked 
airport passengers for their WTP to offset CO2 emissions caused by their flights. Mean WTP 
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for the reduction of one tCO2 across all passengers amounted to 25€, with a remarkable 
geographical variation: Mean WTP for Asian travellers was found to be the lowest at a value 
of 10€/tCO2 while European participants were recorded as willing to pay a mean value of 
41€/tCO2. In a similar study MacKerron et al. (2009) estimated WTP for offsetting CO2 
emissions of a hypothetical flight from New York to London to be approximately 28€/tCO2. 
Achtnicht (2012) measured the WTP for the reduction of CO2 emissions using data from 
interviews with potential car-buyers across Germany. The interviewees were presented with a 
stated preference choice experiment consisting of hypothetical car types that differed in 
various characteristics such as price, propulsion technologies, fuel type, and CO2 emissions. 
Achtnicht estimated a median WTP for the reference group which resulted in a range of 89€ 
to 256€/tCO2, significantly higher than the aforementioned estimates. In a recent paper, 
Blasch and Farsi (2014) reported on survey data pertaining to the mean WTP for voluntary 
carbon offsets in the range of 0.75€/tCO2 to €16.60€/tCO2 depending on the emission activity. 
Second, there are the relatively few studies that attempt to elicit the real demand for voluntary 
climate change mitigation from a purely individual perspective. Löschel et al. (2013) sold 
EUAs at different prices to a sample of 202 subjects from the Mannheim, Germany 
population. A median WTP of zero and a mean WTP of 12€/tCO2 were found. A similar 
framed field experiment with cash incentives was conducted by Diederich and Goeschl 
(2014a) who determined the willingness to abate one tCO2 among the German Internet-using 
population. In their design, 2,440 participants faced a real trade-off between a cash prize and 
guaranteed emissions reductions through the retirement of EUAs. They estimated a zero 
median WTP and a mean WTP of about 6€/tCO2.  
Comparisons of the two different approaches show that in general the revealed preferences 
studies result in lower demand for voluntary climate change mitigation and therefore in lower 
values for WTP. One potential reason for this difference is that the stated preferences 
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approach suffers from what has been called the hypothetical bias in the literature and, hence, 
leads to rather optimistic estimates for the demand for voluntary climate change mitigation 
and derived WTP values. The existence of hypothetical bias in the demand for private and 
public goods has been shown in a variety of decision situations (Blumenschein et al. 2008, 
Cummings et al. 1995, 1997) and in a meta-analysis of the hypothetical bias Murphy et al. 
(2005) report a median ratio of hypothetical WTP to actual value of 1.35. 
The cheap talk script has been suggested as a device to reduce or even eliminate hypothetical 
bias (Cummings and Taylor 1999, Landry and List 2007). The effect of cheap talk is, 
however, ambiguous in the literature. While some studies find that hypothetical bias is 
reduced (Aadland and Caplan 2003, Brown et al. 2003, Champ at al. 2009, Moser et al. 2014) 
other studies find no effect of cheap talk (Blumenschein et al. 2008) or that it even 
exacerbates hypothetical bias (Morrison and Brown 2009, Aadland and Caplan 2006). Finally, 
List (2001) shows that cheap talk is only effective for subjects with little experience in the 
market. 
The third branch of literature consists of experimental studies that determine the effect of 
voting institutions in social dilemma situations. Walker et al. (2000) and Margreiter et al. 
(2005) report that group members cooperate more in a common-pool resource experiment 
under enforced voting rules compared to a no-vote scheme. Kroll et al. (2007) and Kosfeld et 
al. (2009) estimated the effect of different voting mechanisms on the level of contributions to 
a public good and found that a binding vote significantly increases overall contributions. 
Thus, a collective action is able to increase cooperation in social dilemma situations – at least 
if the result of the collective action is binding to all subjects of the group. The theoretical 
argument behind this observation is rather simple (e.g. Bernard et al. 2013). Since free-riding 
within the group is prevented, there is no longer a unique Nash equilibrium of complete free-
riding. For instance, if all subjects vote for the cooperative solution, the majority decision will 
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not change when a single subject changes her decision. This means that also full contributions 
to a public good constitute an equilibrium which payoff-dominates all other equilibria 
including the zero contribution equilibrium. Additionally, Bernard et al. (2013) and Hauser et 
al. (2014) consider situations where the effect of the collective action is limited to a subgroup 
of subjects only and find that if players vote in subgroups only, there is less over-extraction 
than if contributions are determined individually. In one of our treatments, a binding 
collective action into the determination of the contribution to the public good is also 
implemented. In our case, however, the subgroup (n = 100) is extremely small in relation to 
the overall population. In a similar framed field experiment Löschel et al. (2014) implemented 
a collective action into the decision of an even smaller group (n = 32) and found that the 
probability of purchasing EUAs is higher in the treatment with collective action compared to 
the treatment with individual action. Additionally to their study, we investigate the collective 
action effect for a hypothetical and real decision situation and for a larger group.  
 
3. Sample and experimental design 
Between 21th and 28th of July 2014 we drew an internet sample of 3,103 subjects from the 
German voting population. The participants are between 18 and 66 years old and are more 
likely to hold an academic degree than the general population as depicted in Table 1. The 
survey was conducted by the internet survey provider YOUGOV and participants were 
enumerated with bonus points equivalent to 60 €cent.  
 
Table 1: Basic demographics 
Demographic characteristic  Sample Population aged 18 - 66 
Male 51% 50% 
Mean Age  43 43 
Academic degree  23% 18% 
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We gave participants the possibility to choose between a cash award and a certificate from the 
EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) about one ton of CO2, which we then bought and 
deleted. Thus, respondents decided between a cash award and the reduction of one ton of CO2 
emissions by deletion of one European Emission Allowance (EUA). This reduction can be 
seen as a voluntary contribution to a global public good in which the cash award represents 
the opportunity costs of this decision. Therefore, the individual WTP for voluntary climate 
change mitigation is at least the cash award if the subject choses the certificate. 
Each participant was randomly allocated to one of the following treatments: One treatment 
with real payoffs and real emission reductions (“REAL”) and two hypothetical treatments 
(“HYPO”), one with cheap talk (“CT”) and one without cheap talk (“nCT”). All treatments 
were conducted in an individual setting (“Ind”) and a collective setting (“Coll”). In the 
collective setting the individual contribution was replaced by a group contribution, where all 
group members received the majority choice. Table 2 presents the resulting number of 
respondents in the three by two split sample design.  
 
Table 2: Number of respondents in each treatment 
# Respondents (Treatment) Individual (Ind) Collective (Coll) 
REAL  516 (REAL_Ind) 519 (REAL_Coll) 
Hypothetical (HYPO) with Cheap Talk (CT) 519 (HYPO_Ind_CT) 514 (HYPO_Coll_CT) 
Hypothetical (HYPO) without Cheap Talk (nCT) 513 (HYPO_Ind_nCT) 522 (HYPO_Coll_nCT) 
 
 
 
Cash awards or prices for the certificate varied from 2€ to 30€ and were randomly assigned to 
the participant. Each participant was allocated to one of five price groups and asked three 
times about her choice with three different prices. Table 3 shows the price groups and prices. 
We chose this particular design, because this way it was possible to ensure equal group sizes 
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for the Coll treatment at the price level. We drew one group out of the five and realized one of 
the three decisions. Thus, a participant had a one to five chance to be in the winning group. 
Expected payoff for Ind with approximately 100 subjects in each group equals 1,600€ if 
everybody takes the cash award. In Coll it is not possible to calculate the expected payoff as 
there is only one draw that must be realized for 1/5th of the respondents. In the most expensive 
case (3,000€) we would randomly draw a price of 30€ and pay out the price for 100 subjects 
if the majority decides to take the cash award. 
 
Table 3: Price groups and prices 
Price group  Plow Pmiddle Phigh 
I 2 8 14 
II 6 12 18 
III 10 16 22 
IV 14 20 26 
V 18 24 30 
 
 
Before the decision screen, we gave participants information about the EU ETS, explaining 
the principle and scope of emission trading. The information screen was followed by an 
instruction screen that explained the rules and included an example for the decision. 
Translation of the information screen is given in Annex A1 and the instructions for the 
REAL_Ind and REAL_Coll groups are given in Annex A2 and A3. The hypothetical 
treatments vary only in that the wording was adapted to reflect a hypothetical situation. The 
cheap talk script is reproduced in Annex A4.  
 
4. Hypotheses 
Although the marginal benefit of a contribution to the global public good climate change is 
zero while marginal costs are positive, there is ample empirical evidence from previous 
revealed preferences studies (Diederich and Goeschl 2014a, Löschel et al. 2013) and the 
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literature on donations (e.g. Andreoni 1990), that shows that contributions are not zero as 
predicted by standard economic theory based on selfishness. On the one hand, positive 
contributions can be explained by moral motivations, which are associated with contributing 
to the public good itself rather than with the effect of the contribution (Cooper et al. 2004). 
For example, subjects could receive a warm glow of giving (Crumpler and Grossman 2008), 
could buy moral satisfaction instead of ascribing an economic value to the public good 
(Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), gain from a positive self-image (Johansson-Stenman and 
Svedsäter 2010), or follow deontological decision rules that cause them to disregard 
consequences and instead decide on the basis of morally mandated duties to do the right thing 
(Spash 2006). On the other hand, it is possible that some subjects are willing to contribute 
only under the condition that others also do so (e.g. Sugden 1984, Fischbacher et al. 2001). 
Since in REAL all decisions are individual, only those conditionally cooperative subjects who 
expect that others will also “bear their share” should contribute. However, since free-riding 
within the group is possible strong incentives exist to understate the demand for the public 
good. 
Our design, in particular, allows us to test three hypotheses about the voluntary contribution 
to climate change mitigation.   
 
1) The effect of cheap talk 
Since the effect of cheap talk is ambiguous in the literature, we test whether cheap talk is 
effective in a framed field experiment about the voluntary demand for a global public good. 
We test the following hypothesis regarding the proportion of subjects who choose the 
certificate, : 
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H1:   	__ = 	__    and   	__ = 	__ . 
 
2) The effect of the hypothetical decision situation 
The existence of hypothetical bias, i.e. higher demand for the good when preferences are 
stated instead of being revealed, has been shown in a variety of decision situations. However, 
as presented in the literature review, there is some evidence that by means of a cheap talk 
script the bias can be eliminated or at least reduced. Therefore, we derive the following 
hypothesis: 
H2:   _ = 	__    and   _ = 	__ .2 
 
3) The impact of collective action 
The effect of purchasing certificates on German or even global CO2 emissions in our 
experiment is negligible – even if all members of a group (n = 100) chose the certificate. 
Therefore under standard theory we expect zero contributions and no effect of the collective 
action. However, taking into account the empirical evidence on voluntary contributions 
positive contributions can be expected. Furthermore, in a collective action treatment 
incentives to contribute to the public good change. On the one hand, since free-riding within 
the group is prevented, there is no longer a unique Nash equilibrium of complete free-riding 
and full contributions to the public good also constitute an equilibrium (Bernard et al. 2013). 
Yet in our case subjects do not perceive a monetary payoff from the global public good and 
the full contribution equilibrium is payoff dominated by the zero contribution equilibrium, 
hence it should not be observed. On the other hand, since all subjects have to contribute the 
same amount, subjects who tend to follow the strategy of a conditional co-operator in 
comparison to REAL have an additional incentive to cooperate in Coll. They are assured that 
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everybody in the group makes the same contribution, which makes them contribute more than 
in Ind. Thus, from this perspective contributions can be expected to be higher in Coll than in 
Ind. Therefore, our last hypothesis is:  
H3:   _ = _    and   	__ = 	__ . 
 
5. Results  
For each of the two REAL treatments a price vector and one of the three decisions (prices) 
were randomly selected. For REAL_Ind, the price of 22€ and for REAL_Coll the price of 14€ 
was chosen. In REAL_Ind at this price out of 105 participants 47 chose the cash award and 58 
the certificate. In REAL_Coll the majority chose the certificate (50 to 54) and everyone in the 
group received a certificate for deletion. Therefore 47 participants received the 22€ cash 
award and 162 EU ETS allowances were bought and deleted.3 4  
 
5.1 Univariate tests of hypotheses  
In this section our hypotheses are tested with a test for the equality of proportions. Therefore 
we calculate the share of buyers of certificates, , in each treatment. Because we have 
three observations per subject we additionally test each price-quantity combination 
individually.  
 
1)  The effect of cheap talk  
Figure 1 shows the demand curves for the groups with and without cheap talk. On the left side 
the demand for the individual treatment is presented and on the right side for the collective 
action treatment. The demand curves are not decreasing monotonically, but the fitted values 
show that there is a clear downwards trend with increasing price. The difference in shares 
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between treatments is low and the demand curves are overlapping for many prices, suggesting 
that cheap talk has no effect on demand.  
 
Figure 1: Demand curves for Cheap Talk vs. no Cheap Talk by Ind and Coll 
 
 
We can test for an effect of cheap talk with a test for equality in proportions, which is 
summarized in Table 4. The table shows the shares of buyers of certificates – for all prices 
and for the individual price levels (low, middle and high). This way, each observation is used 
only once in the tests at the individual price level. All tests fail to reject the hypothesis H1 of 
no effect of cheap talk.  
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Table 4: Test for equality proportions for the effect of cheap talk 
  Ind   Coll 
  
HYPO 
_CT n 
HYPO 
_nCT n  P>|z|  
HYPO 
_CT n 
HYPO 
_nCT n  P>|z| 
Total  0.63 1557 0.64 1539 0.513 0.68 1542 0.70 1566 0.343 
By price  
low (1st) 0.70 519 0.70 513 0.936 0.73 514 0.74 522 0.772 
middle (2nd) 0.62 519 0.63 513 0.664 0.67 514 0.69 522 0.441 
high (3rd) 0.58 519 0.60 513 0.544   0.65 514 0.67 522 0.567 
 
 
 
2)  The effect of the hypothetical decision situation 
Figure 2 shows the demand curves and fitted values for the REAL and HYPO treatments 
(with cheap talk). Hypothetical bias seems to be present and increasing with price in Ind, 
whereas in Coll bias seems to decrease with price.  
 
Figure 2: Demand Curves for REAL vs. HYPO 
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Table 5 presents the test for the presence of hypothetical bias. We can reject the hypothesis 
H2 of no hypothetical bias with high confidence, whether observations are pooled or at the 
level of each single decision. Overall we find a bias of 8 (Ind) to 11 (Coll) percentage points 
on the demand for certificates.  
 
Table 5: Test for equality proportions for the hypothetical bias 
  Ind   Coll 
  REAL n HYPO 
_CT n  P>|z|  REAL n 
HYPO 
_CT n  P>|z| 
Total  0.56 1548 0.63 1557 0.000 0.58 1557 0.68 1542 0.000 
By price  
low (1st) 0.62 516 0.70 519 0.007 0.62 519 0.73 514 0.000 
middle (2nd) 0.54 516 0.62 519 0.009 0.56 519 0.67 514 0.000 
high (3rd) 0.51 516 0.59 519 0.020   0.55 519 0.65 514 0.002 
  
 
3) The impact of collective action 
Figure 3 shows the influence of collective decision making on the demand for certificates for 
REAL (left) and HYPO_CT (right). The demand curves seem to overlap with real transaction 
but in a hypothetical decision situation, demand seems to be larger for many bidding points.  
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Figure 3: Demand curves for Ind vs. Coll 
 
 
Table 6 gives the test results for differences in proportions for all observations and by price. 
In REAL we cannot reject the hypothesis H3 of no influence of collective decision making, 
but in HYPO we can reject the null hypotheses overall and for the second and third prices.  
 
Table 6: Test for equality of proportions for the influence of collective action 
  REAL    HYPO_CT 
  Ind n Coll n  P>|z| 
 
Ind n Coll n  P>|z| 
Total  0.56 1548 0.58 1557 0.279 0.63 1557 0.68 1542 0.003 
By price  
low (1st) 0.62 516 0.62 519 0.957 0.70 519 0.73 514 0.178 
middle (2nd) 0.54 516 0.56 519 0.478 0.62 519 0.67 514 0.077 
high (3rd) 0.51 519 0.55 519 0.227   0.59 519 0.65 514 0.040 
  
 
To sum up, the univariate tests of our hypotheses show that there is no effect of cheap talk, 
that hypothetical bias is present and that collective decision making changes demand only in 
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the hypothetical treatment. Because there is no effect of cheap talk we will pool the 
hypothetical treatments from now on and discuss the pooled results. 
 
5.2 Willingness to pay (WTP) for the abatement of one ton of CO2 
One non-parametric estimator for the WTP from dichotomous responses is the lower bound 
Turnbull (LBT) estimator (Haab and McConnel 2003). Table 7 shows the Turnbull WTP for 
each treatment. 
 
 
Table 7: Lower bound Turnbull and median WTP 
in € WTP SD Median 
REAL_Ind 16.15 0.48 22-30 
REAL_Coll 13.79 0.32 >30 
HYPO_Ind 18.77 0.36 >30 
HYPO_Coll 18.15 0.25 >30 
  
 
At first it stands out that WTP in REAL_Coll is lower than in the corresponding Ind 
treatment, which is opposed to our hypotheses and incoherent with the scatterplots in Figure 
3, which indicate that the shares of certificates are higher in the Coll treatment for most of the 
offered cash prices. This result demonstrates that sometimes the Turnbull WTP cannot be 
calculated consistently over several treatments if demand is not decreasing monotonously. 
The reason is that differences in WTP are artificially generated by asymmetries in the cell-
pooling procedure, in particular if the last cost category is pooled in only one treatment group 
as the following example of our data shows. Table 8 shows the complete calculation for the 
Turnbull WTP for the REAL treatments according to the instructions in Annex B1. 
WTPREAL_Ind is 16.15€ and WTPREAL_Coll is 13.79€. To test for differences in the lower bound 
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Turnbull WTP a t-test can be employed.5 With a t-value of 4.05 we find that the difference is 
significant at the 1% level.  
This difference, however, is sensitive to small changes in the dataset. If one leaves out five 
observations that chose a certificate for the highest price, WTP should decrease, because the 
share of subjects that choose the cash amount increases. Instead WTPREAL_Coll is increasing by 
3€ to 16.92€ (as shown in Annex B2) and the difference to WTPREAL_Ind disappears. The new 
t-value is 1.12 and therefore we cannot the reject the hypotheses of equal average WTP in 
these two treatments. This example shows that a comparison of Turnbull WTP can lead to 
erroneous conclusions about treatment effects. To circumvent this problem we use an 
alternative smoothing method.  
 
Table 8: Turnbull WTP for REAL_Ind and REAL_Coll 
Lower Bound Turnbull for REAL_Ind 
  
Lower Bound Turnbull for REAL_Coll 
tj Nj Tj Fj Fj* fj* ELB V(ELB)   tj Nj Tj Fj Fj* fj* ELB V(ELB) 
2 33 101 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.01 2 45 104 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 
6 39 103 0.38 0.38 0.05 0.10 0.04 6 33 102 0.32 p.b. 
8 40 101 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.09 0.00 8 50 104 0.48 0.42 0.04 0.07 0.03 
10 41 105 0.39 p.b. 10 41 104 0.39 p.b. 
12 46 103 0.45 0.43 0.04 0.30 0.01 12 38 102 0.37 p.b. 
14 87 206 0.42 p.b. 14 93 209 0.44 0.42 0.01 0.05 0.02 
16 48 105 0.46 0.46 0.03 0.32 0.04 16 45 104 0.43 p.b. 
18 96 205 0.47 0.46 0.00 0.05 0.00 18 81 206 0.39 p.b. 
20 48 105 0.46 p.b. 20 45 105 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.05 0.08 
22 47 105 0.45 p.b. 22 44 104 0.42 p.b. 
24 56 102 0.55 0.50 0.04 0.76 0.00 24 50 104 0.48 0.47 0.04 0.81 0.01 
26 48 105 0.46 p.b. 26 49 105 0.47 p.b. 
30 58 102 0.57 0.57 0.07 1.59 0.09 30 47 104 0.45 p.b. 
30+       1 0.43 12.94   30+       1 0.53 12.81 
Lower Bound Turnbull:             16.15 0.23 
  
Lower Bound Turnbull:              13.79 0.17 
 
 
A less susceptible quantity adjustment is to calculate the no-shares of a fitted demand curve 
and calculate the Turnbull WTP on the basis of these fitted shares, which results in a 
WTPREAL_Ind of 16.64€ and WTPREAL_Coll of 17.23€.6 In accordance with the line and 
scatterplots in Figure 3, WTP is slightly higher in the Coll treatment, but the difference is not 
significant.  
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Now we can summarize the t-test results for differences in WTP in Table 9. To control for the 
influence of cost-level smoothing, we present the classic Turnbull WTP and the “fitted” 
Turnbull WTP. The upper panel shows the results for the test of the presence of hypothetical 
bias. We find a significant difference in mean WTP for Ind and Coll for both smoothing 
procedures. For example in Ind, hypothetical fitted WTPLBT is 19.13€/tCO2 and real fitted 
WTPLBT is 16.64€/tCO2. The difference is 2.49€ and therefore hypothetical WTP is 1.15 times 
larger than real WTP. For Coll the ratio is 1.20. The lower panel summarizes the results for 
the test of the influence of collective decision making. As already demonstrated, the 
difference between real WTP in Ind and Coll is influenced by the Turnbull smoothing 
procedure. Therefore we only interpret the fitted Turnbull WTP. There is no influence of 
collective decision making on mean WTP in REAL (note however that median WTP in 
REAL_Ind is 22€ - 30€ and in REAL_Coll median WTP is above 30€), but there is a 
statistically significant influence of Coll in the HYPO treatment, although the difference is 
only 1.50€.  
 
Table 9: Differences in WTP 
  Hypothetical decision situation 
Ind   Coll 
Treatment  
REAL_ 
Ind  
HYPO_ 
Ind 
t-
value 
p-
value 
REAL_ 
Coll  
HYPO_ 
Coll 
t-
value 
p-
value 
Turnbull  
WTP  
16.15 
(0.23) 
18.77 
(0.13) 3.10 p<0.01 
13.79 
(0.10) 
18.15 
(0.06) 10.70 p<0.01 
Fitted Turnbull 
WTP 
16.64 
(0.17) 
19.13 
(0.08) 4.99 p<0.01   
17.23 
(0.17) 
20.63 
(0.07) 6.90 p<0.01 
  Collective action 
REAL   HYPO 
Treatment  
REAL_ 
Ind  
REAL_ 
Coll 
t-
value 
p-
value 
HYPO_ 
Ind  
HYPO_ 
Coll 
t-
value 
p-
value 
Turnbull  
WTP 
16.15 
(0.23) 
13.79 
(0.10) 4.05 p<0.01 
18.77 
(0.13) 
18.15 
(0.06) 1.42 p>0.1 
Fitted Turnbull 
WTP 
16.64 
(0.17) 
17.23 
(0.17) 1.02 p>0.1   
19.13 
(0.08) 
20.63 
(0.07) 3.83 p<0.01 
Notes: Variances in parentheses. P-values are two-sided.   
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5.3 Econometric analyses  
This section presents logit models to estimate treatment and covariate effects on the 
probability to buy the certificate. Table 10 summarizes the independent variables of the 
following models. The covariates include standard demographic variables such as gender, 
age, education and income. Additionally, we test the influence of attitudes towards the 
environment and climate policies. 71% of respondents are worried or very worried about 
global warming. 33% stated that they deem the EU ETS fit to reduce CO2 emissions, whereas 
50% stated this about the subsidies to promote renewable energies. Almost one third of 
respondents agree to the statement “It is pointless if I do something against climate change as 
an individual.” We use this statement as a proxy for dilemma awareness, which measures the 
degree to which the sample is aware of the social dilemma of emission reductions. Dilemma 
awareness has been found to affect WTP for public goods (Liebe et al. 2011). Finally, we 
measure the degree of pro-environmental behaviour with the Personal Norm Scale (Stern et 
al. 1999, Steg et al. 2005, Steg et al. 2013) which explains support for pro-environmental 
action. The question wording and the scale properties are given in Annex C.  
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Table 10: Summary of independent variables 
Variable  Mean (SD) Min Max 
Male 0.51 0 1 
Age 43 (13) 18 66 
Kids in HH 0.30 0 1 
Single  0.40 0 1 
Academic degree  0.23 0 1 
Green party voter  0.12 0 1 
HH income  
   500-1,499 (low) 0.22 
  1,500-2,999 (middle)  0.34 
  3,000-10,000+ (high and very high)  0.27 
  Missing  0.18 
  Worry 0.71 0 1 
Emission trading  0.33 0 1 
Renewables 0.50 0 1 
Dilemma awareness  0.28 0 1 
Personal norm 3.12 (0.88) 1 5 
 
 
 
The results for the full models are presented in Table 11. The dependent variable indicates 
whether a subject chose the certificate over the cash amount. Overall, the logit results confirm 
the univariate results of the treatment influences. We find no effect of cheap talk, therefore 
hypothetical treatments with and without cheap talk are pooled together in the following 
analysis.7 We observe hypothetical bias as a significant difference in the probability to buy a 
certificate between REAL and HYPO and a significant influence of collective decision 
making in the hypothetical treatment but not in REAL. Columns 1 and 2 present the results 
for the REAL groups and add an indicator for HYPO. The odds ratio of being in the 
hypothetical group over being in the REAL group are 1.36, indicating that the odds of buying 
a certificate are 36% higher in the hypothetical group. In the collective decision group the 
odds of choosing the certificate over the cash price are 66% higher.8 Columns 3 and 4 present 
the results for the hypotheses of the effect of collective decision making. The coefficients for 
the treatment indicators show that the change to a collective decision framework has no effect 
on the probability to choose the certificate when real transactions are involved but it does 
have a positive effect in a hypothetical setting.   
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Furthermore, we find evidence for the factors underlying the decision. First, for individual 
decisions the price of the certificate reduces the odds of buying by 2.7% for each additional 
Euro or by 18% for a standard deviation of 7.49€ [100 ∗ ( ( ."#$%)∗#.%") − 1)]. Second, 
income categories have a positive influence on the decision in the REAL treatments. For 
example, in the REAL treatments a high income positively correlates with the probability to 
choose the certificate. The last column, which includes only observations from the HYPO 
treatments, shows no effect of income. Other demographic variables are mostly insignificant 
or only significant in one or two of the four regressions.   
 
Table 11: Logistic regressions for treatment effects 
  Hypothetical bias Collective action  
 1 2 3 4 
 Ind Coll REAL HYPO 
Price (centered at mean 16€)  0.97*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 
Male 0.98 0.80** 0.92 0.88 
Age 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Kids in HH 0.75** 0.90 0.63*** 0.91 
Single 1.14 0.93 1.21 0.93 
University degree 1.11 1.15 1.06 1.17 
Votes Green 1.45** 1.13 1.08 1.37** 
HH Income      
Middle 0.98 1.35** 1.56** 0.95 
High and very high 1.36 1.16 1.65** 1.09 
Missing  1.44** 1.26 1.87*** 1.15 
Worry  1.56*** 1.27 1.56*** 1.35*** 
Policy preferences      
Emission trading  2.40*** 2.21*** 2.21*** 2.27*** 
Renewables 1.53*** 1.61*** 1.18 1.78*** 
Trading#Renewables  0.40*** 0.42*** 0.53** 0.38*** 
Dilemma awareness  0.70*** 0.52*** 0.43*** 0.74*** 
Personal norm 1.25*** 1.34*** 1.25*** 1.33*** 
HYPO  1.36*** 1.66***   
REAL Coll    1.04  
HYPO Coll    1.27*** 
Observations 4416 4395 2946 5865 
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.072 0.080 0.059 
Notes: Choice of certificate is the dependent variable, coefficients are presented as odds ratios,  
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors are corrected for clustered observations.   
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Policy preferences are also important for the decision to choose the certificate. Subjects who 
state that emission trading or renewable energy policy is effective in reducing CO2 emissions 
have larger probability to choose the certificate. The indicator emission trading takes the 
value one if subjects think that emission trading is effective. In the presence of the interaction 
term the coefficient of 2.40 means that subjects who think that emission trading is effective, 
but renewable energy is not, have (on average) 140% larger odds to choose the certificate than 
subjects who believe that neither option is effective. Subjects who believe that emission 
trading and renewable energy is effective have a 2.40 ∗ 0.40 = 0.96 times smaller odds than 
subjects who believe that only renewable energy is effective and a 1.53 ∗ 0.40 = 0.57 times 
smaller odds than subjects who believe that only emission trading is effective. Believing that 
only emission trading is effective has therefore the largest effect on the probability to choose 
the certificate and the stated policy preferences are consistent with the choice of certificates.9 
The coefficient for dilemma awareness measures the effect of the belief that it makes no sense 
to reduce reduction, if others are not doing the same. As expected dilemma awareness reduces 
the probability to choose the certificate. Personal norm is a scale that measures a propensity 
to act environmentally friendly. Accordingly, the more people state to act environmentally 
friendly in their daily lives, the larger the probability to choose the certificate.  
 
23 
 
Table 12: Average predicted probabilities to buy a certificate 
Notes: ∆Pr refers to the average discrete change /01 ∆Pr (cert =1|9:)∆ℎ<=  and ∆Pr |>:,@ = >@  to the second 
difference /01 ∆Pr (cert =1|9:,@ =1,9:,@−1)∆ℎ<= − /01
∆ Pr Acert =1B9:,@ =0,9:,@−1C
∆ℎ<= ; for calculation of significance 
levels and confidence intervals for second differences the stata user written program mlincom (Long 
and Freese 2014) was used; confidence intervals given only for significant results; ***p<0.01 **p<0.05. 
 
Predicted probabilities to buy a certificate 
 Ind Coll 
 
 Mean 
Pr 
[95% Conf. 
 Interval] 
Mean 
Pr 
[95% Conf. 
 Interval] 
REAL  56.6 52.6 60.7 58.7 54.7 62.6 
HYPO  64.2 61.5 67.0 69.8 67.1 72.4 
∆Pr  7.5 2.6 12.4 11.1 6.4 15.8 
Income         
∆Pr |hhinc = low   16.6*** 6.5 26.5 10.7** 0.3 21.2 
∆Pr |hhinc = middle   3.6   8.4** 1.1 15.7 
∆Pr |hhinc = high   7.1   13.1*** 4.4 21.7 
∆Pr |hhinc = missing  -0.1   11.1** 0.5 21.7 
Moral decision making        
∆Pr |∆green  0.9   -1.4  
∆Pr |∆worry  -0.7   -1.5*** -2.4 -0.1 
∆Pr |∆Pn(2 → 4)  -0.5   -1.6*** -2.5 -0.1 
Policy preferences         
∆Pr |∆dilemma  0.9   1.5*** 0.1 2.4 
∆Pr |∆trading  0.5   0.9   
 
 
To examine the determinants of hypothetical bias we will discuss results on the probability 
scale. Table 12 shows that the average probability to buy a certificate is 57% for REAL and 
64% for HYPO in the Ind group. The difference corresponds to the amount of hypothetical 
bias in the probability to buy a certificate, which is on 7.5 percentage points in Ind and 11.1 
percentage points in Coll, but this change is not significant. Thus, hypothetical bias in terms 
of probability to buy is 1.13 (Ind) and 1.19 (Coll). The confidence intervals for the differences 
in probability are, however, quite wide. Table 12 also shows the average marginal effect of 
HYPO at different levels of income and for different characteristics of respondents. In Ind, 
hypothetical bias is largest for subjects with low income and not significant for subjects with 
any other income including missing values, which goes so far, that in a separate regression 
excluding observations with low incomes eliminates hypothetical bias.10 Furthermore other 
characteristics have no influence on hypothetical bias. However, this does not apply to the 
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Coll group where the effect of income on hypothetical bias is constant. People with larger 
personal norm or who worry about climate change exhibit a smaller bias and people who are 
aware of the social dilemma aspect of the public good have a larger bias than those who are 
not.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates factors that affect the voluntary demand for climate change mitigation. 
Three main potential drivers of the demand are investigated: (i) the framing of the 
hypothetical decision situation either with or without a cheap talk script, (ii) whether the 
decision for climate change mitigation causes real monetary costs or not, and (iii) the effect of 
a collective action on the contribution level of a small group of subjects. As a vehicle to 
facilitate real contributions to climate change mitigation the EU ETS was used. Our main 
results can be summarized as follows. We find a significant hypothetical bias in the voluntary 
demand for climate change mitigation, which in WTP terms is 1.15 (Ind) and 1.20 (Coll). In 
terms of probability to contribute, hypothetical bias is characterized by a large spread of 
between 3 and 16 percentage points. Remarkably, the bias for the individual decision 
treatment is completely caused by subjects with low income, whereas the bias in the collective 
treatment is explained by additional determinants, such as environmental awareness, which 
partially corresponds with the analysis of Mjelde et al. (2012), who also found that the 
environmentally conscious tend to show less bias. Collective action influences voluntary 
demand for climate change mitigation only in a hypothetical decision situation and not if 
subjects face real monetary incentives. We do not observe an effect of the cheap talk script. 
The observed hypothetical bias is surprisingly small. One potential reason for this result lays 
in the experimental good employed as vehicle for climate change mitigation. Large 
hypothetical bias can be observed for goods with a high moral content such as species 
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protection (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 2012). EU ETS allowances are a rather abstract 
good without such a positive reputation. They could have even a negative reputation due to 
the recent discussions about the effectiveness of the EU ETS (e.g. Koch et al. 2014) and the 
discussions about tax fraud.11 Additionally, Diederich and Goeschl (2014b) demonstrate in a 
within comparison of contribution choices that project based Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) are favoured over ETS allowances. Thus, our design presumably delivers a “lower 
bound” for the hypothetical bias of voluntary contribution to climate change mitigation.  
Furthermore, our results are related to the literature on the effects of partial collective action 
on the contributions to public goods. Similarly to these experiments we observe a higher 
proportion of subjects who contribute to the global public good if a collective action is 
implemented. However, we observe such a “partial voting effect” (Hauser et al. 2014, Bernard 
et al. 2013) only when decisions are hypothetical. When subjects face real monetary 
incentives the effect vanishes. The fact, that we observe a collective action effect only under 
hypothetical decisions is consistent with economic theory. While in a regular public good 
setting under collective action full contribution constitutes a payoff-dominant equilibrium, in 
our global public good setting under partial collective action this is no longer the case. When 
marginal benefits are zero and marginal costs are positive, the full contribution equilibrium is 
payoff-dominated by the zero contribution equilibrium and should not be observed. 
But again one has to take into account that our good is extremely abstract and probably lacks 
the positive moral evaluation usually associated with environmental public goods, which 
could be a reason why other studies find a social context effect in both hypothetical and real 
settings. For example, Alpizar et al. (2008) find that the influence of social information and 
anonymity is about the same when subjects make actual monetary contributions as when they 
state hypothetical contributions. Similarly Mozumder and Berrens (2011) find that the social 
context effect – voting disclosure – occurs in real and hypothetical settings, but that the 
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hypothetical cases are more prone to social context and that the effect is muted by perceived 
benefits.  
Given our surprisingly small hypothetical bias and the collective action effect specific to 
hypothetical setting, it would be interesting to check whether for goods with different moral 
content and perceived benefit the bias differs. This could be done by using CER offsets with 
specific ancillary benefits of climate change mitigation. We leave this question for further 
research.  
                                                          
1
 In this paper, all WTP values are, if necessary, converted to € values using the 2010 ECB average reference 
exchange rate for US$ (€ 1 = US$ 1.3257) or GBP (€ 1 = GBP 0.8578). 
2
 For the following hypotheses we use the cheap talk variant of the hypothetical treatment, because for stated 
preferences applications this is generally considered as the more robust procedure to elicit WTP.   
3
 A transaction confirmation is available under https://bsturm.htwk-leipzig.de/uehleke/fairpayclim/  
4
 Note that 173 participants (5.6% of the sample) decided inconsistently, because they chose the certificate at a 
high price, but not at a low price. We did not exclude these participants, since we are interested in the overall 
behavioural effect. A separate analysis shows that excluding these participants has no effect on the results.  
5
 The test statistic for the difference in average WTP constitutes Q = RSSSSSSSTURSSSSSSSV
WXYTVZXYVV
 (Haab and McConnel 2003, 
p.76; Carson et al. 2004, p.183). 
6
 The WTP calculation with the fitted shares is given in Annex B3.  
7
 We repeated the analyses with separate groups which did not change results. Results can be delivered upon 
request from the corresponding author.  
8
 Note that it is not possible to compare effect sizes across different logit models. A test for difference in 
hypothetical bias between Ind and Coll requires the respective interaction effect, which in a separate regression 
is not significant. Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal hypothetical bias in Ind and Coll.  
9
 We confirmed that the interaction effect is significant for all observations with the stata user written 
programme inteff (Norton et al. 2004).   
10
 Results in Annex D. 
11
 See for example https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/carbon-credit-fraud-causes-more-5-billion-
euros-damage-european-taxpayer-1265. 
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Annex A1: Information Screen  
 
Information on the European Emissions Trading System 
The EU Emissions Trading System for carbon dioxide (CO2) came into force in 2005. 
Emission trading is the key instrument of climate policy in Europe, which is based on a 
simple principle: It is specified how much CO2 the participating sectors (power generators and 
energy-intensive industries) are allowed to emit until 2020. This total amount is distributed as 
emission rights from the state (so-called "Certificates") to the companies. For each unit of 
CO2 emitted, the company must give such a certificate to the state. The certificates can be 
traded between companies.  
For every ton of CO2 that is emitted by a facility, such as a coal power plant, the plant 
operator has to show appropriate authorization in the form of a certificate. This has an 
important consequence: If the total quantity of allowances is reduced, then the total emissions 
must be reduced simply because the plant operators have fewer allowances at their disposal. 
This means that if a certificate for a ton of CO2 is bought and deleted, the total CO2 emissions 
are reduced by exactly this one ton. 
Emission trading has a central advantage. It ensures that avoidance of CO2 emissions takes 
place where it is cheapest. Companies with inexpensive ways to avoid CO2 will sell 
allowances. Companies where avoidance is rather expensive purchase certificates. This trade 
ensures that the emission target is achieved at minimal cost.  
European electricity producers and the energy-intensive industry may emit a total of about 2 
billion tons CO2 in 2014. In comparison, the global CO2 emissions in 2013 were 
approximately 36 billion tons of CO2. 
To sum up: If you decrease the total amount of allowances in the EU ETS, European total 
emissions of CO2 are reduced.   
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Annex A2: Instruction screen for the REAL_Ind treatment 
 
Instructions 
 
1. Payoff  
You can now choose between a cash payment, and a certificate of one ton of CO2 emissions 
from the EU Emissions Trading System. The probability that you win and your decisions will 
be realized is 20%. Therefore, it is in your interest that you make every decision as if your 
decision would be realized. 
Won certificates will be removed permanently from the trade for you by the research team of 
the Leipzig University of Applied Sciences. Due to the deletion of a certificate, European CO2 
emissions will be reduced by one ton. 
 
2. Decision 
You will have three possibilities to decide between a cash payment and the deletion of a 
certificate in the following form:  
Please choose now between the cash payment or the emissions trading certificate about one 
ton of CO2 with subsequent deletion. 
 
I would like the … 
() ... €€ Euro cash payment 
() ... emissions trading certificate about one ton of CO2 
 
For the winners one the three decisions is randomly selected and depending on how you have 
chosen in this situation, you receive the cash payout or a certificate that will be deleted for 
you by the research team.  
The winners will be notified by email. A summary of the study and the verification of the 
amount of deleted certificates will be published on the website of the Faculty of Business 
Administration of the Leipzig University of Applied Sciences.  
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Annex A3: Instruction screen for the REAL_Coll treatment 
 
Instructions 
 
1. Payoff  
You can now choose as a group between a cash payment, and a certificate of one ton of CO2 
emissions from the EU Emissions Trading System. The probability that your group wins and 
the decision of your group will be realized is 20%. Therefore, it is in your interest that you 
make every decision as if you would be realized. 
Won certificates will be removed permanently from the trade for you by the research team of 
the Leipzig University of Applied Sciences. Due to the deletion of a certificate, European CO2 
emissions will be reduced by one ton. 
 
2. Voting 
You can now vote on whether each member of your group receives a cash payment or 
whether all members receive a certificate for deletion. Your group is composed of 100 
participants. If more than half of the participants vote for the cash payment, each participant 
will receive the cash payment and if more than half of the participants vote for the deletion of 
a certificate, each participant will receive a certificate for deletion. 
You will have three possibilities to decide between a cash payment and the deletion of a 
certificate in the following form:  
Please vote now for the cash payment or for the emissions trading certificate about one ton of 
CO2 with subsequent deletion. 
I vote for ... 
() ... €€ Euro cash payment 
() ... The emissions trading certificate through a ton of CO2  
 
For the winning group one of the three decisions is randomly chosen and depending on how 
the group has decided in this situation, you receive the cash payout or a certificate that will be 
deleted for you by the research team.  
 
The winners will be notified by email. A summary of the study and the verification of the 
amount of deleted certificates will be published on the website of the Faculty of Business 
Administration of the Leipzig University of Applied Sciences.   
35 
 
Annex A4: Cheap talk script  
 
In surveys is often observed that some respondents state to be willing to pay large amounts for 
environmental goods such as clean air. Probably these respondents do not account in this 
moment that they would have to dispense with other things, if they had to actually pay he 
amount of money they stated in the survey. We therefore ask you to decide in the following 
situations as if your decision would have real consequences, that means as if you actually 
received either the cash payment or the certificate. The results of the study will be published 
on the website of the Faculty of Business Administration of the Leipzig University of Applied 
Sciences.  
 
 
 
Annex B1: Calculation of Turnbull WTP  
 
The lower bound Turnbull is computed in the following steps: 
1. Calculate the share of no answers: Fj=Nj/Tj 
2. Compare Fj with Fj+1, if Fj < Fj+1 continue, if Fj >= Fj+1 these cells are pooled and the 
combined no
 
shares of these cells calculated: Fj*= Nj*/Tj* 
3. This is repeated until a monotonously increasing cdf is formed.  
4. Calculate fj*= Fj+1*- Fj* for each bid level t. This corresponds to a consistent estimator 
of the probability that WTP falls between the price j and price j+1.    
5. Multiply every bid with the according probability that WTP falls between this bid and 
the next higher bid t+1.   
6. Sum over the quantities of step 5 to obtain lower bound Turnbull WTP, which is then:  
)()( *
0
*
1 j
M
j
jjLB FFtWTPE ∑
=
+ −= , and can be interpreted analogous to the consumer 
surplus as sum of the marginal value multiplied by the adapted quantitites, or the 
integer over the quantity of a demand curve (Haab and McConnel 2003). 
7. Calculate the variance: [(\]) = ∑ _`
∗abU_`∗c
`∗ (Qd − QdUb)ef
∗
dgb ,  
where Tj* is the common amount of observations of the eventually pooled bid cell. 
 
  
36 
 
Annex B2: Lower Bound Turnbull for REAL_Coll without five observations at bid=30 
tj Nj Tj Fj Fj* fj* ELB V(ELB) 
2 45 104 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.00 
6 33 102 0.32 p.b. 
8 50 104 0.48 0.42 0.04 0.07 0.03 
10 41 104 0.39 p.b. 
12 38 102 0.37 p.b. 
14 93 209 0.44 0.42 0.01 0.05 0.02 
16 45 104 0.43 p.b. 
18 81 206 0.39 p.b. 
20 45 105 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.05 0.04 
22 44 104 0.42 p.b. 
24 50 104 0.48 0.47 0.05 0.96 0.02 
26 49 105 0.47 p.b. 
30 47 99 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.03 0.09 
30+ 1.00 0.53 15.76 
Lower Bound Turnull:    16.92 0.20 
  
 
Annex B3: Turnbull WTP (fitted) for REAL_Ind and REAL_Coll 
Lower Bound Turnbull (fitted) for REAL_Ind  Lower Bound Turnbull (fitted) for REAL_Coll 
tj Nj Tj Fj Fjfitted fjfitted ELB V(ELB)   Nj Tj Fj Fjfitted fjfitted ELB V(ELB) 
2 33 101 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.01 45 104 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.01 
6 39 103 0.38 0.37 0.03 0.06 0.04 33 102 0.32 0.40 0.01 0.02 0.04 
8 40 101 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.08 0.01 50 104 0.48 0.41 0.00 0.03 0.01 
10 41 105 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.11 0.01 41 104 0.39 0.41 0.00 0.04 0.01 
12 46 103 0.45 0.42 0.01 0.14 0.01 38 102 0.37 0.42 0.00 0.05 0.01 
14 87 206 0.42 0.43 0.01 0.17 0.00 93 209 0.44 0.42 0.00 0.06 0.00 
16 48 105 0.46 0.44 0.01 0.20 0.01 45 104 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.07 0.01 
18 96 205 0.47 0.46 0.01 0.23 0.00 81 206 0.39 0.43 0.00 0.08 0.00 
20 48 105 0.46 0.47 0.01 0.25 0.01 45 105 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.09 0.01 
22 47 105 0.45 0.49 0.01 0.28 0.01 44 104 0.42 0.44 0.00 0.10 0.01 
24 56 102 0.55 0.50 0.01 0.31 0.01 50 104 0.48 0.44 0.00 0.11 0.01 
26 48 105 0.46 0.51 0.01 0.34 0.01 49 105 0.47 0.45 0.00 0.12 0.01 
30 58 102 0.57 0.54 0.03 0.73 0.04 47 104 0.45 0.46 0.01 0.25 0.04 
30+   1 1 0.46 13.73     1 1 0.54  16.24  
Lower Bound Turnbull:    16.64 0.17   Lower Bound Turnbull:    17.23 0.17 
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Annex C: Covariates for the attitudes towards the environment and climate policies 
Variable Question wording  
Worry Are you generally concerned about global warming or not? 
Emission 
trading  
How suitable or unsuitable do you think is the European Emission 
Trading System for the reduction of CO2 emissions? 
Renewables 
How suitable or unsuitable do you think are the current subsidies 
for the promotion of renewable energies for the reduction of CO2 
emissions? 
Dilemma 
awareness  
It is pointless if I do something against climate change as an 
individual. 
Personal 
Norm Scale  
I don't buy fruit and vegetables from far countries to save 
emissions.  
I feel obliged to consider the climate impact of my daily activities. 
I feel better when I save emissions. 
I have a bad conscience when I drive a car instead of using public 
transport.  
In my daily activities I try to save as many emissions as I can. 
Notes: All question were answered on a five point Likert-scale, the items to 
measure Personal Norm were summarized in a scale that yielded an alpha value of 
0.81.   
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Annex D1: Hypothetical Bias without different income categories (Ind) 
 Inc≠low Inc≠middle Inc≠high Inc≠missing 
Price  0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 
Male 1.03 1.00 0.90 0.98 
Age 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Kids in HH 0.78 0.71** 0.68*** 0.84 
Single 1.11 1.05 1.25 1.16 
University degree 1.12 0.94 1.18 1.20 
Votes Green 1.52** 1.13 1.48 1.67*** 
HH Income      
Low - Ref Ref Ref 
Middle  Ref - 1.04 0.96 
High and very high 1.38** 1.35 - 1.34 
Missing  1.49*** 1.42** 1.50** - 
Worry  1.42** 1.59*** 1.54*** 1.73*** 
Policy preferences      
Emission trading  2.37*** 2.57*** 2.90*** 2.07*** 
Renewables 1.51*** 1.65*** 1.54*** 1.44*** 
Trading##Renewables  0.45*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.47*** 
Dilemma awareness  0.71*** 0.64*** 0.74** 0.73*** 
Personal norm 1.30*** 1.28*** 1.28*** 1.16** 
HYPO  1.20 1.48*** 1.36** 1.45*** 
Observations 3477 2907 3201 3663 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.072 0.073 0.061 
Notes: Choice of certificate is the dependent variable, coefficients are presented as odds  
ratios, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors are corrected for clustered observations;  
Ref – Reference Category.  
 
 
Annex D2: Hypothetical Bias without different income categories (Coll) 
 Inc≠low Inc≠middle Inc≠high Inc≠missing 
Price  0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
Male 0.72*** 0.80 0.83 0.85 
Age 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Kids in HH 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.91 
Single 1.03 0.87 1.01 0.85 
University degree 1.27 1.10 1.26 1.02 
Votes Green 1.07 1.37 1.11 1.03 
HH Income      
Low - Ref Ref Ref 
Middle  Ref - 1.37** 1.31 
High and very high 0.87 1.16 - 1.12 
Missing  0.94 1.24 1.25 - 
Worry  1.25 1.29 1.13 1.42** 
Policy preferences      
Emission trading  2.46*** 1.83*** 2.21*** 2.42*** 
Renewables 1.62*** 1.37 1.81*** 1.65*** 
Trading##Renewables  0.40*** 0.54** 0.36*** 0.39*** 
Dilemma awareness  0.51*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 
Personal norm 1.41*** 1.27*** 1.43*** 1.28*** 
HYPO  1.67*** 1.74*** 1.59*** 1.66*** 
Observations 3477 2889 3168 3651 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.063 0.072 0.077 
Notes: Choice of certificate is the dependent variable, coefficients are presented as odds  
ratios, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors are corrected for clustered observations; 
Ref – Reference Category. 
 
